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GETTING TO “EXEMPT!”: PUTTING THE
RUBBER STAMP ON SECTION 501(C)(3)’S
POLITICAL ACTIVITY PROHIBITION
Michael Fresco*
Under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), certain public charities
are exempt from income taxation. As a condition to this benefit, such
organizations are prohibited from participating or intervening in any
political campaign on behalf of, or in opposition to, a candidate for public
office. The statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder, however,
do not clearly define what activities are prohibited. This lack of clarity,
combined with the U.S. Supreme Court’s protection of the political speech
rights of other business organizations, has led many commentators to
question section 501(c)(3) on constitutional grounds. Others have
criticized the statutory scheme for creating inefficiencies in enforcement
and compliance efforts. This Note examines the constitutional and policy
questions surrounding section 501(c)(3), catalogues existing proposals to
change it, and proposes its own changes to cure those deficiencies. It
concludes that a bright-line rule should be used to determine when
revocation of tax-exempt status is appropriate, and that revoked entities
should be permitted to file for exemption under section 501(c)(4).
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INTRODUCTION: 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL SPEECH
On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its most
controversial ruling in years. Citizens United v. FEC1 invalidated federal
limits on corporate independent expenditures that expressly advocate for
election or defeat of political candidates,2 opening the door to political
campaigning by corporations.3 Public response to, and criticism of, the
decision have been vehement and widespread.4 The decision helped spark a

1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id. at 913 (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
3. See, e.g., Greg Stohr, Corporate Campaign Spending Backed by U.S. High Court,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aU.fsorJbt3E.
4. See Editorial, The Broken System of Campaign Finance, U-T SAN DIEGO (Dec.
5, 2011),
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/dec/05/the-broken-system-of-campaignfinance/?print&page=all; Cornel West Arrested at Supreme Court Protest, CBS NEWS (Oct.
16, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/10/16/national/main20121158.shtml; Sam
Favate, Udall: Amend the Constitution, Wipe Out Citizens United, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG
(Nov. 2, 2011, 12:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/02/udall-goes-nuclear-proposes
-amendment-to-wipe-out-citizens-united/; Richard L. Hasen, Super-Soft Money: How
Justice Kennedy Paved the Way for “SuperPACS” and the Return of Soft Money, SLATE
(Oct.
25,
2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2011/10/citizens_united_how_justice_kennedy_has_paved_the_way_for_the_re.html; Jim
Hightower, Citizens United Against Citizens United: A Grassroots Campaign to Restore
Democracy, OPEDNEWS (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.opednews.com/articles/CitizensUnited-Against-Ci-by-Jim-Hightower-111023-31.html; New York City Council Passes
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a political movement, 5 a national day of protest, 6 and multiple proposed
constitutional amendments.7
The Court ruled in Citizens United that “Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”8 While
the decision invalidated campaign restrictions for both nonprofit and forprofit corporations, 9 one type of organization remains shielded from its
reach. Public charities 10 exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) are prohibited from engaging in political
campaign activity. 11 Because of the special deference given to tax laws by
the Supreme Court, Citizens United did not expressly overrule section
501(c)(3)’s political activity prohibition.12
The prohibition, however, is much criticized. 13 The vagueness of its
terms 14 causes uncertainty for charities trying to avoid prohibited activity,
and makes enforcement difficult for the IRS. 15 The prohibition also faces
scrutiny on constitutional grounds for restricting charities’ protected
speech. 16 As Citizens United floods the “marketplace of ideas” 17 with the
voices of other corporations, 18 charities will need to speak louder in order
Resolution Opposing Corporate Personhood, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/new-york-city-council-pas_n_1186411.html.
5. See Andrew Fleming, Adbusters Sparks Wall Street Protest: Vancouver-Based
Activists Behind Street Actions in the U.S., VANCOUVER COURIER (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://www.vancourier.com/Adbusters+sparks+Wall+Street+protest/5466332/story.html
(noting that the Occupy Wall Street movement began “to protest corporate influence on
democracy”).
6. See Occupy the Courts, MOVETOAMEND.ORG, http://movetoamend.org/occupycourts (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
7. S.J. Res. 33, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing a constitutional amendment “to
expressly exclude for-profit corporations from the rights given to natural persons by the
Constitution of the United States, prohibit corporate spending in all elections, and affirm the
authority of Congress and the States to regulate corporations and to regulate and set limits on
all election contributions and expenditures”); H.R.J. Res. 90, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing
a constitutional amendment mirroring the language of S.J. Res. 33); H.R.J. Res. 88, 112th
Cong. (2011) (proposing a constitutional amendment stating that “[t]he words people,
person, or citizen as used in this Constitution do not include corporations, limited liability
companies or other corporate entities”); S.J. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing a
constitutional amendment granting Congress authority to regulate campaign expenditures).
8. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
9. Id. (“No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”).
10. This Note uses the term “charities” to refer only to organizations described under
section 501(c)(3). No other meaning of the word “charity” attaches to its use.
11. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
12. See generally Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens
United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity
Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867 (2011) (arguing that the prohibition will likely
withstand constitutional attack after Citizens United).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.B.ii.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539
U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
18. See Eduardo Porter, Editorial, How the Big Money Finds a Way In, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2011, at SR12 (discussing independent expenditures after Citizens Untied).
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to be heard. Taken together, these factors indicate that challenges to section
501(c)(3)’s political activity ban are likely. 19
This Note addresses the growing call for congressional reform of section
501(c)(3)’s political activity prohibition. It does not advocate total removal
of the ban, nor does it inquire whether charities should be allowed to
engage in political activity. Instead, this Note accepts Congress’s intent as
valid, while acknowledging that the current state of the ban is ineffective in
guiding charities, and potentially vulnerable to constitutional attack after
Citizens United. Part I summarizes the landscape of existing law
comprising the political activity prohibition, including the Code, Treasury
regulations, and revenue rulings. Part II summarizes the prohibition’s
criticism on practical and constitutional levels. Part III reviews proposals to
change the prohibition, grouping them into three categories: definitional,20
quantitative, 21 and remedial. 22 Part IV analyzes those proposals and
suggests a distinct solution, with an eye toward making the ban more
efficient and constitutionally secure.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PROHIBITION
This part examines the law governing the political activity of section
501(c)(3) organizations. First, it reviews the statute, looking at its
legislative history and analyzing its text. Second, it summarizes the
regulations promulgated by the Department of the Treasury to enforce the
statute. Third, it summarizes the IRS’s major revenue rulings in the area.
This part concludes by articulating Congress’s and the IRS’s current
understanding of law: (1) the kind of activity that is prohibited, (2) how
much of that activity charities may engage in, and (3) the consequences of
engaging in such activity.
A. The Prohibition According to the Internal Revenue Code
Charitable organizations are exempt from income taxation under sections
501(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Code. 23 Section 501(a) provides for exemption,
while 501(c)(3) describes what kinds of organizations qualify. 24 Donations
19. See Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens
United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 416 (2012) (“A challenge
to the constitutionality of the Political Activities Prohibition thus seems inevitable.”);
Galston, supra note 12, at 873.
20. Definitional proposals focus on changing what activities are and are not considered
“intervention” or “participation” under section 501(c)(3). See infra Part III.A.
21. Quantitative proposals focus on changing how much “intervention” or
“participation” is allowed under section 501(c)(3). See infra Part III.B.
22. Remedial proposals focus on changing the consequences facing charities that violate
section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition. See infra Part III.C.
23. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) exempts any “[c]orporations, and any
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.” Id. § 501(c)(3).
24. See id. §§ 501(a), (c)(3).
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made to section 501(c)(3) organizations are deductible from the donor’s
own income tax (the charitable deduction).25 The Supreme Court
characterized the exemption of charities and the charitable deduction as a
congressional effort to subsidize the activities of nonprofit organizations
that promote the public welfare. 26
The Code requires an organization to meet three criteria in order to
receive tax exemption and for its donors to qualify for the charitable
deduction: (1) no part of its earnings may inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, (2) the organization does not engage in
substantial lobbying activities, and (3) the organization does not engage in
political activity. 27 This section discusses the statutory definition of
political activity by examining the legislative history and the text of the
Code.
1. A Brief Legislative History of the Prohibition
Charitable organizations have been exempt from taxation since the
enactment of the Tariff Act of 1913.28 In its original form, the statute did
not condition exemption on abstaining from political activity. 29 The first
indication of governmental distaste for such activity is found in a regulation
enacted by the Bureau of Revenue in 1915.30 This regulation, Treasury
Decision 2137, prevented any business from deducting as a business
expense any “[s]ums of money expended for lobbying purposes and
contributions for campaign expenses.” 31 In 1919, the Department of the
Treasury issued Treasury Decision 2831, 32 stating that organizations
“formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda” were not
“educational” for purposes of tax exemption.33

25. Id. § 170(a).
26. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); see
infra notes 219–31.
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) prohibits intervention in political campaigns as
well as substantial lobbying activities. Id.
28. Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (exempting from income taxation “any corporation or
association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or individual”); see BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 35 (10th ed. 2011); Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a
Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits; Why; to What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903, 905
(2001). While Congress attempted to enact substantially similar language in the Tariff Act
of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 556, that statute was struck down as unconstitutional in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
29. 38 Stat. 114, 172; see also Dessingue, supra note 28.
30. Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws,
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003) (citing T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 57–58 (1915)).
31. T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 57.
32. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170 (1919).
33. Id. at 285; ERIKA LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33377, TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 3
(2007); Houck, supra note 30, at 9.
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The modern statutory restrictions on the political activities of charities
were first proposed as amendments to the Revenue Act of 1934. 34 As
proposed, the amendment would have prevented charities from substantial
“participation in partisan politics or . . . carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”35 The amendment was
criticized as too broad, 36 however, and the language relating to political
participation was dropped. 37 Thus, section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying limitation,
but not the political activity ban, was enacted in 1934.38
Section 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban was enacted as an amendment to
the Revenue Act of 1954. The provision was proposed as a floor
amendment by then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, 39 and as such was not
subject to debate by committee.40 The congressional record does not reflect
the motivation or rationale behind the amendment, other than its intent to
deny tax-exempt status “to those who intervene in any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for any public office.”41 It is now acknowledged
that Johnson likely proposed the amendment in response to the support that
certain exempt organizations gave to his rival during Texas’s Democratic
primary election in 1954. 42
Congress amended the political activity prohibition in 1987 to include the
In enacting the 1987
phrase “in opposition to” any candidate.43
amendment, Congress determined that the definition of political activity
34. See Houck, supra note 30, at 16.
35. 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934); Houck, supra note 30, at 21.
36. 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (statement of Sen. Reed) (“[T]his amendment goes much
further than the committee intended to go.”); HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 578; Houck, supra
note 30, at 21.
37. 78 CONG. REC. 7,831 (statement by Rep. Hill); see also LUNDER, supra note 33, at 4;
Houck, supra note 30, at 22–23.
38. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 36; LUNDER, supra note 33, at 4; Houck, supra note 30, at
23; see also Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 700 (exempting charitable organizations,
“no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation”).
39. 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954); HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 608; LUNDER, supra note
33, at 4; Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign
Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1078–79 (2007);
Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of
Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 152 (2006). See
generally Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the
Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001).
40. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 608; Amelia Elacqua, Eyes Wide Shut: The Ambiguous
“Political Activity” Prohibition and Its Effects on 501(c)(3) Organizations, 8 HOUS. BUS. &
TAX L.J. 113, 117 (2007); Kemmitt, supra note 39, at 152.
41. 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (statement of Sen. Johnson). Nor does the conference report
analyze the provision. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 608 n.7; see also H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543,
at 46 (1954) (stating that the House deferred to the Senate amendment regarding campaign
intervention).
42. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 608; Kay Guinane, Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining
Prohibited Intervention in Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
142, 160 (2007); Houck, supra note 30, at 24; Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A
First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious
Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 880–81 (2001); O’Daniel, supra note 39, at 740–68.
43. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat.
1330–464; HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 608.
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was imprecise, and that this lack of clarity gave rise to difficulties in
compliance and enforcement efforts.44 The change was meant to clarify
what activities were prohibited, 45 but expressly did not “change current
law.” 46
In sum, the congressional record is largely silent as to the motivation
behind the enactment of the political activity prohibition. It is clear from
earlier Treasury rulings and proposed legislation, however, that Congress
intended organizations described by section 501(c)(3) to be kept out of the
political sphere.
2. Examining the Text of the Code
Section 501(c)(3) defines political activity as “participat[ing] in, or
interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office.” The statute does not further define any of these terms. 47
Other sections of the Code discuss political activity, but they do not
meaningfully elaborate on its definition in relation to section 501(c)(3)
organizations. 48 Section 170, which sets forth the deductions allowed for
charitable contributions,49 repeats verbatim section 501(c)(3)’s definition of
political activity. 50 Section 4955 offers something slightly different; it
describes the tax levied on charities for their political expenditures,51
defining “political expenditure” as “any amount paid or incurred by a
section 501(c)(3) organization in any participation in, or intervention in
(including the publication or distribution of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.” 52 Section 4955 thus repeats section 501(c)(3)’s primary language,
but adds that spending funds is one form of participation or intervention in
political campaigns.
Similarly, section 6852, which calls for the immediate determination and
collection of taxes payable for charities that engage in flagrant political

44. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 100TH CONG.,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON LOBBYING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 37 (Comm. Print 1987).
45. Id. at 42.
46. Id. For example, the clarification did not affect the permissibility of voter education
projects or other nonpartisan activities. Id. at 42–43.
47. See id.; see also LUNDER, supra note 33, at 8.
48. See Elacqua, supra note 40, at 115.
49. I.R.C. § 170(a).
50. Compare id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (defining a “charitable contribution” as one made to an
organization “which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office”), with id. § 501(c)(3) (defining an exempt organization as one
“which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office”).
51. See id. § 4955(a)(1)–(2).
52. Id. § 4955(d)(1).
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expenditures, 53 uses section 4955’s definition of political expenditures.54
Section 6852 continues section 4955’s focus on expenditures as political
intervention, referring to section 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban itself as
“the prohibition against making political expenditures.” 55
Finally, section 527 describes the exemption and treatment of political
organizations, 56 but does not discuss political activity of section 501(c)(3)
organizations. 57 While section 527 defines “candidate”58 and “election”59
in some detail, those definitions apply only for purposes of section 527.60
No other sections of the Code elaborate on the political activity
prohibition. 61
Taken together, these sections indicate that the prohibition covers
participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf of any
candidate, including making statements and spending money for that
purpose.
As a sanction for engaging in political activity, the IRS may impose a tax
on the infringing organization equal to 10 percent of the amount of any
political expenditure.62 Additionally, the IRS may impose a 2.5 percent tax
on individual managers who knowingly agree to the political expenditure.63
If the organization does not “correct” 64 the political expenditure before
assessment of the 10 percent tax, the IRS may impose a tax equal to 100
percent of the uncorrected political expenditure.65 The IRS also has the
inherent authority to revoke the tax-exempt status of any organization that
engages in political activity. 66 Any 501(c)(3) organization whose exempt
53. Id. § 6852(a)(1).
54. Id. § 6852(b)(1).
55. Id. § 6852(a)(1)(B).
56. See id. § 527. Political organizations are those formed primarily for the purpose of
directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures toward influencing a
political election. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id. § 527(g)(3). “Candidate” is defined as someone who (1) publicly announces that
he is a candidate for nomination or election to a federal, state, or local elective public office,
and (2) meets the legal qualifications to hold such office. Id.
59. Id. § 527(j)(6). The definition of “election” includes general, special, primary, or
runoff elections for federal office, conventions or caucuses, primary elections for delegates,
and presidential primary elections. Id.
60. Id. § 527(g)(3), (j)(6).
61. Section 501(c)(3)’s “participation or intervention” language is also repeated in
sections 162(e)(1)(B); 504(a)(2)(B); 2055(a)(2), (3); 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii); 2522(a)(2),
(b)(2), (3); 7409(a)(2)(B)(i), (b)(1).
62. Id. § 4955(a)(1).
63. Id. § 4955(a)(2).
64. To correct a political expenditure is to recover all or part of it, implement safeguards
to prevent future expenditures if recovery is not possible, and comply with any additional
corrective procedures prescribed by the IRS. Id. § 4955(f)(3).
65. Id. § 4955(b)(1). Additionally, any individual manager who refuses to all or part of
a correction is subject to a tax equal to 50 percent of the uncorrected expenditure. Id.
§ 4955(b)(2).
66. See United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981) (“It should be
noted that exemption is lost . . . by participation in any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office.”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1624 (1987) (noting that an
organization will lose its tax-exempt status “if it engages in any political campaign
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status is revoked due to political activity may not subsequently seek
exemption under section 501(c)(4), 67 which exempts organizations operated
to promote social welfare.68 While there are no political restrictions placed
on 501(c)(4) organizations, 69 contributions made to them are not considered
charitable contributions deductible from the donor’s taxable income.70
However, charities whose exempt status has been revoked for political
activity are permitted to resubmit an application for exemption under
501(c)(3) by filing a Form 1023. 71
B. Treasury Regulations Promulgated Thereunder
This section summarizes the Treasury regulations that expand upon the
Code. Congress granted power to the Department of the Treasury to create
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of the statute.72
The federal tax regulations promulgated thereunder 73 represent the
Department’s official interpretation of the Code,74 and are considered
reflective of congressional intent. 75 Regulations have the force of law,76
and are binding on the IRS. 77 While entitled to judicial deference, these
regulations are not binding on courts.78
Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1 defines a “candidate for public
office” as “an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a
contestant for an elective public office, whether such office be national,
State, or local.” 79 The regulation echoes the statute’s description of
“participation” or “intervention” as including “the publication or
distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral
activities”); IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 9635003 (Aug. 30, 1996); HOPKINS, supra note 28, at
608. Revocation may be used in conjunction with the excise taxes described above. See
LUNDER, supra note 33, at 3.
67. I.R.C. § 504(a) (2006).
68. Id. § 501(c)(4).
69. See id.
70. See id. § 170(c)(1)–(5) (defining a charitable contribution as one made to a state or
government possession, an organization operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes (section 501(c)(3) organizations), an organization
of war veterans, or a cemetery corporation).
71. IRS, RESULTS OF REVOCATION OF IRC 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, 1988 EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT 2, 3, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm88.pdf.
72. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
73. Tax regulations are codified in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).
74. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 972; Tax Code, Regulations, and Official Guidance, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=98137,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012)
(“Treasury regulations (26 C.F.R.)—commonly referred to as Federal tax regulations—pick
up where the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) leaves off by providing the official interpretation
of the IRC by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.”).
75. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 13.
76. Id. at 972.
77. Id.
78. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1991) (stating that the
Court will defer to Treasury regulations unless unreasonable); Davis v. United States, 495
U.S. 472, 484 (1990).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(iii) (amended 2008).

3024

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate.”80 The
regulation adds that such activity may “directly or indirectly” impact a
campaign, 81 but it does not define what activity falls into either category.82
While the Code discusses “political activity” in six different sections,83 the
IRS has promulgated corresponding regulations for only three. 84 These
three regulations are largely duplicative of the language used in the Code.85
Thus, the regulations clarify that the statute encompasses statements both
written and oral, the prohibition applies to any elective office (national,
state, or local), and activities that indirectly affect a campaign are
prohibited. While the regulations do not define “indirectly,” the phrase is
important because it expands the prohibition’s reach beyond “express
advocacy” as that term has been defined under federal election law. 86
C. Revenue Rulings
Revenue rulings represent the IRS’s official interpretation of the Code
and regulations. 87 They are determinations of how the law should be
applied to specific factual situations.88 Revenue rulings do not have the
force of law, but do have precedential value for taxpayers. 89 Because they
contain detailed factual applications of the regulations and statute discussed
above, the revenue rulings will be examined here in some detail.
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 applied an IRS Fact Sheet, issued the previous
year, to twenty-one hypothetical examples of political activity, asking
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See I.R.C. § 170(a), (c)(2)(D) (providing a tax deduction for contributions made to
charitable organizations that are not disqualified from tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) for
substantial lobbying or political activity); id. § 501(c)(3) (setting forth the political activity
ban); id. § 527(a), (e)(1), (2) (defining a tax-exempt political organization as one operated
primarily for an “exempt function,” and defining “exempt function” as influencing or
attempting to influence a political election); id. § 4911(a), (c)(1) (permitting a tax on excess
lobbying expenditures by exempt organizations, and defining lobbying as attempting to
influence legislation); id. § 4955(a), (d)(1) (permitting a tax on any political expenditure by a
§ 501(c)(3) organization, and defining “political expenditure” as one incurred by
participating or intervening in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate); id. § 6852(a)
(authorizing the taxation of political activity under § 4955 for the current year or the
preceding one).
84. Elacqua, supra note 40, at 126–27.
85. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(iii) (stating that an organization is a non-exempt
“action organization” if it “participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political
campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office”); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.527-2 (amended 1985) (defining political organizations); Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(f)(2)(ii)
(amended 1972) (denying a deduction under § 170 for contributions made to organizations
that participate or intervene in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate, but deferring to
§ 501(c)(3) to aid in determining if an organization “is engaging in political activities”).
86. See infra notes 330–34 and accompanying text.
87. Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/
0,,id=101102,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
88. Internal Revenue Bulletin, No. 2012-2 at 3 (Jan. 9, 2012) available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb12-02.pdf.; Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief
Primer, supra note 87.
89. Internal Revenue Bulletin, supra note 88.
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whether or not each would be deemed political intervention under section
501(c)(3). 90 The ultimate lesson of 2007-41, which also reflects the current
state of the law regarding the political activity prohibition, is that whether
an activity is permissible “depends upon all of the facts and circumstances
of each case.” 91
2007-41 divides its twenty-one factual scenarios into six broad categories
of possible political activity: (1) voter education, voter registration, and
get-out-the-vote drives; (2) individual activity by organizational leaders; (3)
candidate appearances (as well as candidate appearances in a non-candidate
capacity); (4) issue advocacy; (5) business activity; and (6) websites. 92
1. Voter Education
Voter education initiatives include hosting public forums and publishing
voter guides. 93 Revenue Rulings 2007-41, 94 78-248, 95 and 80-28296 all
examine activities in this area. 2007-41, the most recent of the three, makes
clear that voter education and registration activities are permitted if they are
carried out in a nonpartisan manner.97 If the conduct is found to favor or
oppose one candidate over another, it is prohibited. 98
2007-41 examines two scenarios to illustrate the distinction. In the first,
an organization sets up a booth at a state fair where citizens can register to
vote. 99 The booth does not reference any particular candidate or political
party, except where the voters may note their party affiliation on the
registration form. 100 The ruling concludes that the organization has not
engaged in political activity. 101 In the second example, an organization that
educates the public on environmental issues establishes a telephone bank
and calls voters in the district where a specific candidate is seeking
election. 102 The candidate is distinguished from the incumbent candidate
on an environmental issue. 103 When the organization calls a voter, it
ascertains whether the voter’s environmental view comports with either
90. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. The 2006 Fact Sheet was an
accumulation of all the relevant laws and regulations applicable to § 501(c)(3) organizations
in preparation for the 2006 election cycle. See Election Year Activities and the Prohibition
on Political Campaign Intervention for Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154712,00.html (last updated Oct. 7, 2011).
91. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1421. The "facts and circumstances test" is, in
practice, a catch-all standard whose application varies with the type of activity at issue. It is
the current test for political activity. See infra Part I.D; see e.g., infra notes 93–115, 125–44,
166–70.
92. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1422–26.
93. Id. at 1422.
94. Id.
95. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
96. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
97. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1422.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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If the voter favors the incumbent’s viewpoint, the
candidate. 104
organization ends the conversation.105 If the voter favors the new
candidate’s view, the organization will remind the voter of the upcoming
election and offer to provide the voter transportation to the polls.106
Perhaps not surprisingly, the ruling asserts that this organization has
engaged in political activity. 107
Revenue Ruling 78-248 considers “voter education” activities such as
voter guides and candidate questionnaires.108 The scenarios presented in
the ruling, taken together, indicate that voter guides published annually,
stating the positions of all candidates, and covering a wide range of issues
that are of interest to the electorate as a whole will not constitute political
activity under section 501(c)(3). 109 If a voter guide contains questions that
“evidence a bias on certain issues,” or if the guide covers only one issue,
publication of the guide will be deemed political activity in violation of
section 501(c)(3). 110
Revenue Ruling 80-282 amplifies 111 78-248 by examining the
publication of political newsletters.112 It notes that the format and content
of a newsletter may indicate bias.113 It states, however, that a newsletter
describing all congressional incumbents’ views on certain issues, and
comparing those views to those of the organization, is not political activity
where the newsletter is not published during an election cycle, covers all
incumbents without noting who sought reelection, and neither compares
incumbents nor offers statements supporting or rejecting their views.114
Similarly, publication of a newsletter does not constitute political activity if
it is not widely distributed and is not targeted to a specific electorate, but
rather is given only to the organization’s members. 115
Accordingly, voter education activities are permissible if they are carried
out in a neutral way. They must give equal treatment to all candidates, may
not focus on particular issues, and may not target a specific electorate. If
the education initiatives evidence bias toward a particular candidate, the
activity will be prohibited.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
109. See id. at 154–55.
110. See id.
111. The term “amplified” is used by the IRS when a position taken in a prior ruling is
extended to apply to a new variation of the original factual situation. HOPKINS, supra note 28,
at 976.
112. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
113. Id. at 179.
114. Id. at 178–79.
115. Id.
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2. Individual Activities of Organizational Leaders
Conduct that falls under the “individual activities” heading occurs in the
context of organizational leaders expressing themselves in their individual
capacity, apart from the organization.116 2007-41 states that organizational
leaders are free to speak politically in their individual capacity, but cannot
“make partisan comments in official organization publications or at official
functions of the organization.” 117
In one hypothetical example, the CEO of a hospital exempt under
501(c)(3) personally endorses a candidate. 118 The CEO allows his name
and title to be used in a newspaper ad supporting the candidate, paid for by
the candidate’s campaign committee.119 The ad states that titles and
affiliations are provided for identification purposes only. 120 This is not
political activity because the hospital did not pay for the ad, the ad did not
appear in one of the hospital’s publications, and the endorsement was made
in the CEO’s personal capacity. 121
In a second example, a university president publishes an article in the
university’s newsletter under the heading “My Views,” in which he
personally endorses a candidate.122 The president pays for the publication
of the article with his own funds. 123 This is political activity, because the
endorsement appears in an official university publication. 124
3. Candidate Appearances
Depending on the circumstances, a charity may invite candidates to speak
at organizational events, either in their capacity as candidates or as
individuals. 125 Candidates may also voluntarily attend organizational
events that are open to the public.126 Revenue Rulings 2007-41,127
66-256, 128 74-574, 129 and 86-95 130 all offer guidance on this issue.
In 1966, Revenue Ruling 66-256 held that an organization formed solely
to stage public forums and debates on matters of social or political interest
qualified for exemption from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3).131
The organization in question did not endorse any of the views of its

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1423.
Id.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210.
Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160.
Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73.
See Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. at 210–11.
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speakers, nor did the organization hold views of its own. 132 The ruling
cited Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3), which recognized
public forums and debates as valid means for educating the public under the
Code. 133 The organization was not engaged in political activity, even
though some of its speakers and topics were controversial.134
Similarly, Revenue Ruling 74-574 held that an organization operating a
broadcast station did not engage in political activity by giving free air time
to candidates where the time was provided equally to all candidates.135 The
ruling held that such a presentation was a public service that helped inform
the electorate.136
Revenue Ruling 86-95 states that an organization that held a series of
public forums in congressional districts during election campaigns did not
engage in political activity where the forums were of neutral form and
content. 137 The forums in question invited all legally qualified candidates
to participate; a neutral and independent panel prepared the questions; and
the topics covered a wide range of issues of general public interest, with no
commentary implying approval or disapproval of any candidate’s
answers. 138 The ruling did warn, however, that showing bias toward a
particular candidate might constitute political activity. 139
Ruling 2007-41 sets forth factors that section 501(c)(3) organizations
should consider in determining whether they may invite candidates to speak
at their events. 140 These include whether the organization provides
opportunities for all candidates seeking the same office to speak; whether
the organization indicates support for, or opposition to, any candidate; and
whether any political fundraising occurs at the events.141 These three
factors are, in turn, subject to additional sub-factors. 142 The ruling provides
a nonexclusive list of six such sub-factors to consider in evaluating whether

132. Id.
133. Id. at 211. Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) would later be struck down as
unconstitutionally vague in Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1034–35
(D.C. Cir. 1980). See infra Part II.B.2.
134. Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. at 211.
135. Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160, 160–61.
136. Id. at 161.
137. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73, 73–74.
138. Id. at 74.
139. Id.
140. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423.
141. Id.
142. See id. For example, to determine if an organization has provided adequate
opportunity for other candidates to speak, the IRS will consider whether the questions are
prepared and presented by an independent nonpartisan panel, whether the questions asked
cover a broad range of issues, whether each candidate has ample opportunity to express their
views, whether the candidates are asked to agree or disagree with positions of the
organization, and whether a moderator comments on the candidates’ answers or otherwise
implies approval or disapproval. Id. Similar sub-factors exist for determining whether an
organization has shown support or opposition toward a candidate and whether fundraising
has occurred. See id.
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a candidate’s appearance in a non-candidate capacity constitutes political
activity. 143
Consequently, candidate appearances are permissible if the presentation
and questioning are neutral, all candidates seeking the same office receive
equal opportunities, and the organization does not express approval or
disapproval of any candidate’s answers. The rulings are clear that a
candidate’s presence at an organization-sponsored event does not, by itself,
constitute political activity. 144
4. Issue Advocacy
Issue advocacy refers to charities taking a stance on a particular political
issue, and engaging in conduct that furthers its position on that issue. 145
The distinction between issue advocacy and political intervention is
particularly important because most charities are issue-focused.146
Moreover, the line between issue advocacy and political intervention is
especially difficult to draw. 147
2007-41 states that charities “may take positions on public policy issues,
including issues that divide candidates in an election for public office.”148
However, if those positions convey any message supporting or opposing a
candidate, the organization has engaged in political activity. 149 Support or
opposition may be explicit or implicit, and may be characterized by
reference to political party affiliation or other “distinctive features of a
candidate’s platform or biography.” 150 While “[a] communication is
particularly at risk of political campaign intervention when it makes
reference to candidates or voting in a specific upcoming election,” the entire
context of the communication must be considered. 151
In the first of three hypothetical examples, a university runs a newspaper
advertisement regarding proposed education-related legislation. 152 A state
senator, who will soon be running for reelection, has opposed such
legislation in the past. 153 The ad urges readers to contact the senator
regarding the bill. 154 This is not political intervention, because the ad does
not mention any election, educational issues are not divisive in the
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1424.
146. Cf. Elacqua, supra note 40, at 129 (“This type of activity is the most dangerous
because of the likelihood that it is related to pending elections and thus political campaign
intervention.”); Guinane, supra note 42, at 154 (“[T]he IRS might be blurring the line
between partisan intervention in elections and legitimate issue advocacy. This could have a
chilling effect on charities and religious organizations that want to express points of view on
current issues of interest to their constituencies.”).
147. LUNDER, supra note 33, at 11.
148. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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upcoming election, and the timing of the ad directly relates to the proposed
legislation. 155
In the second scenario, an organization created to inform the public about
the need for public education produces a radio ad that presents statistics
showing that public education is underfunded, and concludes by urging
listeners to contact the current governor about underfunded schools.156 The
ad airs shortly before the governor is to run for reelection, and the
governor’s opponent has made funding of public education an election
issue. 157 The ad is not part of an ongoing series of communications from
the organization regarding this issue, and there was no proposed legislation
regarding education funding at the time the ad was produced. 158 The
organization violates the political activity prohibition because the ad
identifies the governor, appears shortly before an election, is not part of a
series of ongoing communications, is not timed to any proposed legislation,
and takes a position on an issue that the governor’s opponent has used to
distinguish himself.159
The ruling indicates that an organization that takes a stance on an issue
that distinguishes a particular candidate might be found to engage in
political activity, even if the organization is formed to advance that issue.160
The ruling describes seven factors that should be considered in determining
if a communication results in political campaign intervention.161 However,
none of the factors are singularly conclusive. Even a communication that
expressly references a candidate or voting, while “particularly at risk” of
violating the prohibition, is subject to other (potentially curing) facts and
circumstances.162
5. Business Activity
This section covers potentially political conduct that is incidental to the
primary business activity of the organization. For example, 2007-41 states
that political activity may arise in the course of business activity “such as
selling or renting of mailing lists, the leasing of office space, or the

155. Id. at 1425.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. In the third example, the director of a charity violates the prohibition by
referring to an upcoming election while taking a position on a controversial election issue at
a formal organization event. Id.
161. Id. These include whether the statement identifies one or more candidates for office;
whether the communication expresses approval or disapproval of a candidate’s positions or
actions; the temporal proximity of the statement to an election; whether the statement
references voting or an election; whether the issue raised is a distinguishing issue for a
particular candidate; whether the communication is one in a series of regular
communications on the issue made independent of the timing of an election; whether the
timing of the communication relates to some other, non-election-based event, such as
proposed legislation by an officeholder who also happens to be a candidate for election. Id.
162. Id. at 1424.
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acceptance of paid political advertising.”163 Relevant factors include
whether the good or service is available to all candidates equally (or to the
general public), whether the prices charged to candidates represent the
organization’s usual rates, and whether the activity is an ongoing one or is
conducted for a specific candidate. 164 The ruling offers one factual
circumstance where an organization engages in political activity by
providing services to one candidate while refusing service to others.165
6. Web Content
The IRS views a charity’s website as a form of communication. 166 As
such, any opposition or support of candidates on an organization’s website
is subject to the “facts and circumstances” analysis. 167 The status of links
placed on an organization’s website poses a more difficult question. An
organization is responsible for the “consequences of establishing and
maintaining” a link, even if the organization does not control the content on
the linked site. 168 Links to candidate-related material do not in themselves
constitute political activity. 169 Factors to be considered include the context
in which the link is presented, whether links to all candidates are present,
whether the link serves an exempt purpose, and the directness of any link
between the organization’s site and a site containing material favoring or
opposing a candidate. 170
D. The Current State of the Prohibition
The previous three sections described the statute, regulations, and
revenue rulings that, taken together, constitute section 501(c)(3)’s political
activity prohibition. Given the above, section 501(c)(3)’s political activity
prohibition can be described as follows: (1) it prohibits direct or indirect
intervention and participation in political campaigns on behalf of, or in
opposition to, any candidate for public office, with intervention and
participation determined by all the surrounding facts and circumstances; (2)
the prohibition is absolute (no political activity is allowed); (3)
organizations violating the prohibition are subject to excise tax or
revocation of tax-exempt status, and revoked organizations may not seek reexemption under section 501(c)(4).
II. A SUMMARY OF CRITICISM
Part I examined and defined the political activity prohibition of section
501(c)(3). Part II examines potential problems with the prohibition, and
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1425.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1425–26.
Id. at 1426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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why many commentators have called for its reform. First, it describes the
practical limitations of the ban, as evidenced by the confusion of charities
trying to avoid violation, a lack of compliance, and IRS enforcement
problems. Second, it examines and evaluates potential constitutional
attacks to the current regulatory regime. Briefly summarized, the
absoluteness of the ban, and the subject matter it regulates, give rise to
potential First Amendment challenges. The lack of a clear definition for
political intervention gives rise to potential vagueness and overbreadth
challenges. Though the probability of success of any of these challenges is
uncertain, they have been, and will likely continue to be, brought to court.
Taken together, these considerations justify proposals to amend the
prohibition.
A. Practical Limitations in Compliance and Enforcement
While the language of section 501(c)(3) is phrased simply, its exact
meaning has eluded charities, tax professionals, and perhaps the IRS
itself. 171 What is political intervention? What does it actually mean to
intervene on behalf of a candidate? The current regulatory regime does not
directly answer these questions. 172 This section highlights the practical
difficulties engendered by the current state of the political activities
prohibition, and suggests why the prohibition would benefit from change.
Though the body of law governing the political activities of charities is
multilayered, 173 there is a distinct lack of clarity surrounding its
meaning. 174 Part of the prohibition’s problem with precision stems from its
murky origins; the lack of legislative history associated with the enactment
of the prohibition 175 leaves those organizations being regulated without an
171. See Elacqua, supra note 40, at 115 (“The resulting ambiguity has made it difficult
for tax-exempt organizations to confidently advocate for their causes and for the IRS to
investigate and review an organization’s tax-exempt status.”); Guinane, supra note 42, at
145 (“501(c)(3) organizations must draw on a hodge-podge of resources in order to piece
together a best guess of how the IRS might view their advocacy or voter education and
mobilization activities.”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on
Political Activity by Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“[V]iolations of this
prohibition seem to be as elusive as smoke, being both difficult to detect and difficult to
separate from permissible charitable activities.”).
172. See LUNDER, supra note 33, at 8 (noting that “the statute and regulations do not offer
much insight as to what activities are prohibited”); Elacqua, supra note 40, at 115
(“Unfortunately, § 501(c)(3) does not explicitly define ‘political activity,’ nor is it defined in
other sections of the Code that discuss political organizations.”); Johnson, supra note 42, at
880 (“[T]here are definitional questions concerning what constitutes ‘participation’ or
‘intervention’ in a ‘campaign for public office’ as well as who qualifies as a ‘candidate.’”);
Mayer, supra note 171, at 3 (“[The prohibition’s] exact parameters remain frustratingly
unclear.”).
173. See supra Part I (discussing the statute, regulations, and revenue rulings governing
political activity).
174. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 610 (“The standard to apply in determining whether an
organization is involved in a political campaign should be amply clear by this time . . . but it
is not.”).
175. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the legislative history of the political activity
prohibition); see also LUNDER, supra note 33, at 3–4 (stating that the legislative history is
“sparse”); JUDITH E. KINDELL & JOHN FRANCIS REILLY, ELECTION YEAR ISSUES, 2002
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understanding of congressional intent. 176 Furthermore, the regulations
promulgated by the IRS to enforce the Code do little to elucidate its
meaning. 177 While revenue rulings offer more factual explanation than the
statute or regulations, 178 in practice they are difficult to apply. Revenue
rulings generally, and 2007-41 179 in particular, examine scenarios where an
organization has engaged in a single type of political activity. 180 Real
world political activities will often be far more varied and nuanced than the
relatively obvious scenarios presented in the revenue rulings. 2007-41
states that if an organization engages in more than one type of activity, “the
interaction among the activities may affect the determination of whether or
not the organization is engaged in political campaign intervention.”181 The
ruling, however, offers no insight into how the combination of activities
affects that determination.182 While it lists many factors to consider when
analyzing each individual scenario,183 the ruling does not indicate how
those factors are to be weighed, or if any are determinative. 184 Thus, unless
its precise scenario can be found in a revenue ruling, a charity is forced to
guess whether it has a mix of factors that create “political activity.” 185
This lack of clarity creates certain problems. The risk involved with
engaging in activity that is debatably political causes many charities to
abstain from activities that might otherwise further their charitable

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT 335, 337, available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf (“The amendment was accepted; no debate
or discussion took place. The Conference Report contains no further discussion of the
amendment.”); Kemmitt, supra note 39, at 152 (“Because the campaign prohibition was
raised as a floor amendment and not subject to debate, the legislative record is essentially
silent.”).
176. See Dessingue, supra note 28, at 916 (“Because of the paucity of legislative history,
attribution of rationales to the political activity prohibition has been largely an exercise in
projection.”); see also Elacqua, supra note 40, at 117 (“[T]he prohibition began without a
clear indication of the activities the amendment sought to prohibit, and it remains with the
same limited clarity today.”); Johnson, supra note 42, at 880 (“[T]he formal legislative
history of these provisions sheds little light on their purpose, let alone Congress’s thoughts
about their application to religious organizations.”); infra Part IV (discussing the effect of
the prohibition’s lack of legislative history on its meaning).
177. See supra Part I.B; see also LUNDER, supra note 33, at 8 (stating that the regulations
“add little” to the statutory prohibition); Elacqua, supra note 40, at 118 (“[T]he Treasury
regulations do little to alleviate the confusion.”).
178. See supra Part I.C.
179. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (2007).
180. See id. at 1422 (“Note that each of these situations involves only one type of
activity.”); see also Guinane, supra note 42, at 149 (“The scenarios in the Revenue Ruling
are fairly simple, and each one illustrates only one type of activity.”); supra Part I.C
(examining scenarios involving voter education, business activity, and issue advocacy
separately).
181. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421; Guinane, supra note 42, at 149.
182. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (omitting any discussion of the
ramifications of a mix of activities).
183. See supra Part I.C.
184. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
185. See Guinane, supra note 42, at 149 (“This forces 501(c)(3) organizations facing
more complex situations to guess what the IRS would think and to risk an investigation if
they guess incorrectly.”).
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purpose. 186 The uncertainty also poses problems in planning for charities
that feel compelled to engage in advocacy that borders the political.187 As a
result, the IRS has encountered a significant amount of noncompliance
among charities. 188
In 2004, the IRS began the Political Activities Compliance Initiative
(PACI) in response to anticipated increases in noncompliance.189 PACI
consists of a formal set of procedures for educating charities on prohibited
political activity, and examines cases of noncompliance.190 Under PACI,
the IRS investigates potential infringement based on referrals from internal
and external sources. 191 If the Referral Committee decides that a case is
worth pursuing, it will categorize the referral as one of three types based on
its complexity and egregiousness. 192 The IRS will then send a letter to the
organization informing it of the referral, and requesting an explanation of
If the organization “exhibits an
the organization’s conduct.193
understanding of the IRS’s position that a prohibited activity occurred,” and
186. See Elacqua, supra note 40, at 115 (stating that “[t]he resulting ambiguity has made
it difficult for tax-exempt organizations to confidently advocate for their causes”); Joseph S.
Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled Approach to Section 501(c)(3)’s
Prohibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504, 506 (1999) (“In
essence, § 501(c)(3) forces a charity to sacrifice part of its vision and its institutional
character to ensure its operational success.”). Whether political activity by charities is good
for charities themselves, society at large, or neither is a point of some contention, and is
beyond the scope of this Note. This Note assumes that Congress’s intent, to the extent it can
be divined, is valid, and suggests changes to honor that intent. For an analysis of the above
questions, see Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:
Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007) (arguing
that political intervention by charities would be harmful to the charitable sector and to
politics) and Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns by
Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1057 (2008) (arguing that some amount of political participation is proper).
187. See Guinane, supra note 42, at 145 (“Even groups that can afford to pay for legal
advice cannot obtain certainty, because the lawyers can only give their best estimate on how
the IRS might view the facts and circumstances.” (citing Peter Panepento, Tax Lawyers Ask
IRS to Clarify Election Rules for Nonprofit Groups, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/2806/tax-lawyers-ask-irs-to-clarify-rules-fornonprofit-groups-on-election-activities)).
188. Press Release, IRS, IRS Releases New Guidance and Results of Political
Intervention Examinations (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id
=154780,00.html (“[O]ur examinations substantiated a disturbing amount of political
intervention in the 2004 electoral cycle.”); see also HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 609 (“This
prohibition is repeatedly violated, with IRS enforcement of this aspect of the law of taxexempt organizations historically erratic and scant.”); O’Daniel, supra note 39, at 739
(“[T]here is arguably widespread non-compliance with the prohibition and certainly no
groundswell of public support for it.”).
189. IRS, FINAL REPORT: PROJECT 302 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 1
(2006) [hereinafter 2004 PACI REPORT].
190. Examination Procedures—Prohibited Political Campaign Intervention by Section
501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS (July 1, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/
0,,id=179671,00.html.
191. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 189, at 1 n.1.
192. IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE: PROCEDURES FOR 501(C)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter PACI PROCEDURES]. The types are A (singleissue/non-complex), B (multiple issue/complex), and C (egregious/repetitive). Id.
193. Id. at 4.
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if the violation was singular, isolated, and unlikely to be repeated, the IRS
will close the case with a written advisory. 194 If the organization does not
agree that it has engaged in prohibited activity, the IRS will consider
levying an excise tax and revocation.195
In 2004, PACI found that 72 percent of the organizations examined
engaged in some form of political activity. 196 The rate of infringement was
similar in 2006. 197 However, only four organizations faced revocation in
2004, out of 105 closed cases. 198 Though the 2004 report urged future
compliance officers to more readily invoke revocation, 199 they did not; no
revocations were issued for the 2006 election cycle at the time of the 2006
report’s publication. 200 In both 2004 and 2006, over 60 percent of all
closed cases ended with a written advisory letter. 201 While PACI focuses
on expediting election period procedures, 202 its success in this endeavor is
questionable. Too few cases were closed by the time of the 2006 report’s
publication to merit discussion,203 and the results of the 2008 election cycle
are yet to be released.204 The 2004 report also acknowledges the need for
further guidance for agents and possible legislative modifications.205
Given that there are over one million section 501(c)(3) organizations, the
challenge facing PACI is tremendous.206 The IRS acknowledges that the
lack of clarity in the prohibition itself exacerbates this already difficult
task. 207 While written advisories are reportedly used for cases where the
political act was isolated, inadvertent, or corrected,208 failure to enforce the
prohibition for small-scale violations might subject it to a snowball
effect. 209 The rarity with which the IRS imposes excise taxes and
revocation could thus undermine the prohibition, even if most of the cases it
encounters feature only de minimis infringement.
In sum, the political activity prohibition, as it is currently stated, has been
ineffective in guiding both charities and the IRS. Combined with the
194. Id. at 5.
195. Id. at 6.
196. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 189, at 25.
197. IRS, 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 1 (May 30, 2007)
[hereinafter 2006 PACI REPORT].
198. Id. at 5.
199. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 189, at 26.
200. 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 197, at 5. As of the publication of the 2006 report,
however, only 40 out of 100 cases were closed. See id. at 1, 5.
201. Id. at 5.
202. See PACI PROCEDURES, supra note 192, at 6.
203. 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 197, at 1.
204. See Political Activities Compliance Initiative (2008 Election), IRS (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=181565,00.html.
205. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 189, at 26.
206. See id. at 2.
207. See id. at 1.
208. See id. at 18.
209. See Mayer, supra note 171, at 6–7 (“Failing to enforce the prohibition today risks
having the noncompliance grow in the future beyond the IRS’s limited ability to check it,
causing significant damage to the charitable sector as a whole, and exerting undue influence
over elections because of the use of charitable platforms to engage in partisan activity.”).
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constitutional issues associated with restricting political speech, these
realities have led many to call for a change to the prohibition.
B. Questioning the Constitutionality of the Prohibition
Courts and commentators have addressed various constitutional
infirmities associated with section 501(c)(3)’s political activity
prohibition. 210 This section analyzes three: infringement on First
Amendment rights, vagueness, and overbreadth.
1. First Amendment Analysis: A Burden on Speech?
Many have questioned section 501(c)(3)’s political activity prohibition
on First Amendment grounds. 211 Speech, including political speech, is a
fundamental right, and laws burdening it are subject to strict constitutional
scrutiny. 212 Conversely, laws that do not constitute a burden on speech are
evaluated under the highly deferential rational basis standard.213 The
threshold question in assessing a First Amendment challenge to section
501(c)(3), then, is whether the political prohibition is a burden on the
speech rights of charities.214
One way a law might burden speech is by conditioning a tax exemption
on the requirement that a person abstain from their constitutional right to

210. See, e.g., Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-670, 2009 WL
3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1143 (2012) (hearing vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the prohibition); see
also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (hearing a
constitutional challenge to 501(c)(3)’s lobbying restriction); Galston, supra note 12
(analyzing constitutional challenges to the prohibition); Scott W. Putney, The IRC’s
Prohibition of Political Campaigning by Churches and the Establishment Clause, 64 FLA.
B.J. 27 (1990) (arguing that the prohibition violates the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses).
211. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (hearing
a challenge to section 501(c)(3) on free exercise and viewpoint discrimination grounds);
Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972)
(hearing a challenge to section 501(c)(3) on free exercise grounds); Anne Berrill Carroll,
Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political
Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 254 (1992); Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics
and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 319–20
(1990); Johnson, supra note 42, at 887–90; Klapach, supra note 186, at 513.
212. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). Under strict scrutiny, the
government must “prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.’” Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
213. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009) (“Given that the
State has not infringed the unions’ First Amendment rights, the State need only demonstrate
a rational basis to justify the ban on political payroll deductions.”). The rational basis test
asks whether the law at issue is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). The rational basis test is highly deferential to
Congress and the law at issue. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 678 (3d ed. 2006) (“There is a strong presumption in favor of laws
that are challenged under the rational basis test.”).
214. Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 969.
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speak. 215 In Speiser v. Randall, the Supreme Court struck down a law
requiring potential recipients of a property tax exemption to sign an oath
swearing that they did not advocate the overthrow of the U.S.
government.. 216 The Court reasoned that “[t]o deny an exemption to
claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize
them for such speech.” 217 That characterization seems analogous to the
condition placed on charities by section 501(c)(3) to abstain from political
speech. 218
The Court, however, heard and rejected such an argument in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR). 219 In TWR, a
nonprofit organization challenged section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying
restriction, 220 claiming it was an “‘unconstitutional condition’ on the receipt
of tax-deductible contributions.” 221 The Court rejected the organization’s
reliance on Speiser, stating that Congress, through the lobbying restriction,
did not deny the organization any “independent benefit,” but rather “merely
refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys.” 222 This is the notion
that underlies First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of tax law223:
exemption is seen as a form of government subsidy, 224 and “a legislature’s
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right.” 225 Under this logic, section 501(c)(3)’s political activity
prohibition is Congress’s legitimate choice not to subsidize certain
activities, and the prohibition would be evaluated under a rational basis
standard. 226
215. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (“It cannot be gainsaid that a
discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free
speech.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 980.
216. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515, 529.
217. Id. at 518.
218. See Klapach, supra note 186, at 513; supra Part I.A.
219. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
220. No “substantial part” of the activities of a 501(c)(3) organization may consist of
“carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.” I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3).
221. TWR, 461 U.S. at 545.
222. Id. The Court also stated that “[t]he Code does not deny TWR the right to receive
deductible contributions to support its non-lobbying activity.” Id. The accuracy of this
statement might be questioned with respect to the political activity prohibition. See infra
notes 398–400 and accompanying text.
223. See Galston, supra note 12, at 891–97 (discussing the deferential approach used in
tax law First Amendment cases).
224. TWR, 461 U.S. at 544; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)
(“Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally
protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of
their own pockets.”); Galston, supra note 12, at 895.
225. TWR, 461 U.S. at 549; see also Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358–
59 (2009) (ruling that a state’s withholding of payroll deductions did not burden a union’s
political speech rights).
226. See Galston, supra note 12, at 903–11 (examining tax law jurisprudence and
concluding that rational basis is the correct standard for evaluating section 501(c)(3)). Many
legitimate state interests behind the political activity prohibition have been articulated by
courts and commentators: that government should not participate in partisan politics by
subsidizing organizations with legislative or electoral goals, see Christian Echoes Nat’l
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Alternatively, heightened scrutiny may be triggered if a law is
determined to be a content-based restriction on speech. 227 A content-based
restriction is one that inhibits speech because of its message, viewpoint, or
subject matter. 228 One might argue that since the political activity
prohibition regulates speech based on its message (vote for candidate X) or
its subject matter (politics), it is a content-based restriction.
TWR and Cammarano v. United States, however, probably foreclose this
argument. After explaining that refusal to subsidize speech is not an
infringement on the right to speak, the Court in TWR noted that “[t]he case
would be different” if Congress based its choice of subsidy on the
“‘suppression of dangerous ideas.’” 229 Instead, relying on Cammarano,230
the Court did not find such intent in section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying
restrictions. 231 If regulations based on lobbying are not content-based
restrictions, those regulating political speech might not be either.
Given the Court’s tax law jurisprudence, it is unclear whether a First
Amendment challenge to the political activity prohibition would be
successful. However, it must be noted that Citizens United v. FEC232 not
only reaffirmed the fervor with which the Court will guard the First
Amendment rights of business entities, 233 but also guaranteed that charities
will metaphorically need to “speak louder” to make their voices heard
Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972), that allowing charities to
participate in politics would result in their serving private, rather than public, interests, see
e.g., TWR, 461 U.S. at 550, or that involvement in partisan politics is not consistent with a
charitable purpose, see Galston, supra note 12, at 913–15; see also Buckles, supra note 39,
at 1078–95 (discussing each rationale). While the political activity prohibition might not be
narrowly tailored to meet those goals, rational basis review does not require such exacting
standards. Galston, supra note 12, at 912.
227. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents
thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 450 (1991) (“[A] tax scheme that discriminates among speakers does not implicate the
First Amendment unless it discriminates on the basis of ideas.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note
213, at 933; Galston, supra note 12, at 894–95.
228. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 641–43.
229. TWR, 461 U.S. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513
(1959)).
230. 358 U.S. at 513 (“Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums
expended to promote or defeat legislation is plainly not ‘aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.’” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
231. TWR, 461 U.S. at 548. This holding might not prove binding should a court hear a
content-based challenge to the political activity prohibition. The TWR Court considered the
“suppression of ideas” argument in response to allegations that 501(c)(3)’s lobbying
restrictions violated equal protection, since veterans organizations were permitted to engage
in lobbying under I.R.C. § 501(c)(19). See id. The Court held that the denial of exemption
to one speaker and not the other was not aimed at the suppression of ideas. Id. at 549. It did
not consider whether a ban on the subject of lobbying amounted to a suppression of ideas.
The Court ruled precisely that in Cammarano, however. See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
Cammarano held that a Treasury regulation denying business expense deductions for
lobbying efforts was constitutional. Id. That it regulated based on lobbying did not make the
regulation a content-based restriction. Id.
232. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
233. See id. at 913 (“Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity.”).
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among the cacophony of corporate expenditure. This means both that
further challenges are likely, and that they might be looked at differently
than in previous cases.
2. Vagueness Analysis: Does the Prohibition Clearly Describe What Is
Prohibited?
The constitutional doctrine of “vagueness” provides that a law may be
struck down as unconstitutional if a person “of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning,” 234 or when it fails to give officials
explicit guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. 235 The vagueness
doctrine is partly premised on fairness; it is unjust to punish a person
without providing clear notice of what is prohibited. 236 It is also a means of
protection against the potential for discriminatory enforcement inherent in
laws that delegate large subjective and interpretive responsibility to nonlegislative bodies. 237
In the context of the First Amendment, the vagueness doctrine has
special significance.238 Vague laws will likely cause those affected to
“steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked,” 239 thereby inhibiting or “chilling”
otherwise constitutionally protected speech.240 Due to these concerns, the
standard of statutory specificity is higher in the First Amendment
context. 241
Section 501(c)(3)’s political activity prohibition has been challenged in
federal court on vagueness grounds only once. In Catholic Answers, Inc. v.

234. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
235. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,
631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2003).
236. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[W]e insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 942.
237. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09 (“A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 213, at 942 (“[U]nder vague statutes and ordinances the government can choose
who to prosecute based on their views or politics.”).
238. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 942; Goldsmith, supra note 235, at 281.
239. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
240. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 942; Goldsmith, supra note 235, at 284.
241. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982) (“If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a
more stringent vagueness test should apply.”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33
(1963) (“[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
expression. . . . [The] government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 942. Courts use varying standards in evaluating
vagueness challenges depending on the nature of the statute. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455
U.S. at 498. Economic regulations are less strictly evaluated, and civil statutes are allowed
less certainty than criminal statutes. Id. at 498–99.
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United States, 242 a church challenged section 4955, 243 Treasury Regulation
section 53.4955-1, 244 and Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)1(c)(3)(iii) 245 as unconstitutionally vague. 246 Based on the facts of the
case, however, the district court dismissed Catholic Answers’s claims as
moot, since the IRS had already abated the disputed excise taxes.247 Thus,
the court failed to reach the merits of the vagueness challenge.248 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, 249 and the Supreme Court denied
Catholic Answers’s petition for writ of certiorari concerning the finding of
mootness. 250
It is unclear how a court would rule were it to hear a vagueness challenge
to section 501(c)(3). 251 In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 252 the D.C.
Circuit considered a vagueness challenge to Treasury Regulation section
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i). 253 Big Mama Rag, an organization that operated a
feminist newspaper, appealed the IRS’s determination that it did not qualify
for exemption under 501(c)(3) because its activities were not
“educational.” 254 The IRS based its determination in part on the fact that
Big Mama Rag’s activities promoted lesbianism. 255
Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) defined “educational”
for purposes of section 501(c)(3) as relating to instruction on subjects
242. No. 09-CV-670, 2009 WL 3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 F. App’x
640 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1143 (2012).
243. I.R.C. section 4955 describes the excise taxes imposed for political expenditures. See
supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
244. Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1 (1995) provides further detail as to the excise taxes set forth
in section 4955.
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) expands on the definition of “candidate” and
political intervention set forth in section 501(c)(3). See supra notes 51–54 and
accompanying text.
246. Catholic Answers, 2009 WL 3320498, at *2. In its complaint, Catholic Answers
alleged that the statute and regulations were “vague and lacking in terminology susceptible
to objective assessment.” First Amended Complaint for Tax Refund and Declaratory
Judgment at ¶¶ 58–60, Catholic Answers, 2009 WL 3320498 (No. 09-0670) [hereinafter
Catholic Answers Complaint].
247. See Catholic Answers, 2009 WL 3320498 at *10.
248. See id. at *9–10.
249. Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, 438 F. App’x 640, 641 (9th Cir. 2011).
250. Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1143 (2012).
251. See Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and
Constitutional Implications of “Political” Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 196–97
(1985) (noting that “the political activity prohibition of section 501(c)(3), as interpreted in
the regulations and IRS rulings, fails to meet constitutional standards,” but predicting that
“the Court would strive for a limiting construction like that in Buckley, rather than invalidate
the provision altogether as unconstitutionally vague”); Galston, supra note 12, at 922–29
(stating that “it is possible that the standard is not precise enough to afford constitutionally
sufficient notice to taxpayers attempting to comply with its strictures, nor to prevent
arbitrary, viewpoint based enforcement,” but concluding that the statute would likely pass
intermediate scrutiny); Klapach, supra note 186, at 517 (noting possible arguments about
“the inherent vagueness of § 501(c)(3) terms such as ‘propaganda,’ ‘substantial part,’
‘attempts to influence legislation,’ and ‘participation in a political campaign’”).
252. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
253. Id. at 1032.
254. Id. at 1032–33.
255. Id. at 1033.
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“useful to the individual and beneficial to the community.” 256 The
regulation allowed such educational organizations to advocate particular
viewpoints only if the organization presented “a sufficiently full and fair
exposition” of facts that would allow an individual to reach an independent
conclusion on the issue. 257 Big Mama Rag challenged the regulation as
unconstitutionally vague. 258 The circuit court affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the terms “useful” and “beneficial” as used by the
regulation were too subjective, and thus unconstitutionally vague. 259
The D.C. Circuit also invalidated the “full and fair exposition” standard
for two reasons. First, it was unclear which organizations were required to
meet this standard.260 The regulation required organizations that advocated
for a particular viewpoint to meet the standard, but did not define
“advocacy.” 261 The Court noted that the subjective judgment of which
views were “controversial” lent itself to the selective application of the “full
and fair exposition” standard, in contravention of the vagueness doctrine.262
Second, it was unclear what the “full and fair exposition” standard
required. 263 The Court decried as too subjective that part of the test which
asked whether the facts presented were sufficient “to permit an
individual . . . to form an independent opinion,” since the answer would
necessarily vary among individuals. 264 The Court noted the difficulty of
distinguishing facts from opinions, 265 and questioned the relevance of
distinguishing between statements that appeal to the mind as opposed to
emotions. 266
There are at least some parallels between the regulation at issue in Big
Mama Rag and the current scheme defining political activity under section
501(c)(3). 267 While not couched in individualistic language, the current
“facts and circumstances” test used by the IRS to identify political
intervention 268 evinces the same “‘I know it when I see it’” 269 ethos
embodied by the “full and fair exposition” standard. Similarly, revenue
256. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959).
257. Id.
258. See Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1034–35.
259. Id. at 1035–37.
260. Id. at 1037.
261. Id. The IRS attempted to equate advocacy groups with those taking stances on
controversial issues. Id. at 1036 (citing 3 Int. Rev. Manual-Admin. (CCH) pt. 7751,
§ 345.(12), at 20,572 (Apr. 28, 1977)).
262. Id. at 1036–37. The Court found that the standard had, in fact, been applied
selectively to a homosexual organization and others with views “not in the mainstream of
political thought.” Id. at 1036.
263. Id. at 1037.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1038.
266. Id. at 1038–39.
267. Klapach, supra note 186, at 517.
268. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1421; supra Part I.C.
269. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274,
290 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A] ‘we’ll know it when we see it approach’ simply does not provide
sufficient direction to either regulators or potentially regulated entities.”).
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rulings that ask whether an organization’s activities “evidence a bias”270
afford implementing agents some “latitude for subjectivity” 271 in
determining which organizations intervene politically. 272 Allegations of
selective enforcement have been targeted at the IRS, 273 though an
investigation by the Treasury Inspector General of Tax Administration in
2005 found no evidence of subjective investigation.274 Additionally, the
public reporting requirements of PACI 275 likely deter selective
enforcement, 276 or will at least bring any such transgression to light.
Other hurdles exist for a vagueness challenge to the political
prohibition. 277 The Supreme Court allows more statutory uncertainty when
a law subsidizes, rather than regulates, speech.278 In National Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, 279 the Court stated that “when the Government is
acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision
are not constitutionally severe.” 280 This principle may be relevant to
charities, since the Court declared in TWR that “[b]oth tax exemptions and
tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax
system.” 281 In TWR, the Court upheld section 501(c)(3)’s limit on

270. See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
271. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1037.
272. See Kemmitt, supra note 39, at 176 (“As currently written, the campaign activity
prohibition requires the IRS to undertake a highly subjective, fact-intensive inquiry in order
to determine what behavior is acceptable and what behavior is not.”).
273. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION PROCESS FOR REVIEWING ALLEGED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
INTERVENTION BY TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2005) [hereinafter TIGTA 2005 REPORT]
(“There had been several media reports of allegations that the [Tax Exempt and Government
Entities] Division was examining [political] activity just before the 2004 Presidential
election for politically motivated reasons.”); Galston, supra note 12, at 922 n.259 and
accompanying text (citing Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C.
1999) (“Plaintiffs also contend that the IRS selectively prosecuted the Church on the basis of
its political and/or religious views in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the
revocation violated the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”);
Tobin, supra note 186, at 1316 (“[S]ome critics of the IRS’s actions argue that the IRS is
engaged in politically-biased enforcement and is using the Internal Revenue Code to attack
opponents of President Bush.”).
274. TIGTA 2005 REPORT, supra note 273, at 2 (“[W]e did not identify any indications
that the EO function inappropriately handled the information items we reviewed.”); Galston,
supra note 12, at 922–23.
275. See supra Part II.A.
276. Galston, supra note 12, at 923.
277. A vagueness challenge to the political activity prohibition might fail simply because
intervention or participation in a political campaign is not so vague that an ordinary person
must guess at its meaning. See Klapach, supra note 186, at 517.
278. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 942 n.66.
279. 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that a statute that granted discretion to the National
Endowment for the Arts to consider standards of public decency in selecting grant recipients
did not violate artists’ First Amendment rights).
280. Id. at 589.
281. 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
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“substantial lobbying,” 282 sanctioning Congress’s choice “not to subsidize
lobbying as extensively as” other activities of nonprofits.283
The holding in Finley is not dispositive of a hypothetical vagueness
challenge to section 501(c)(3), however. Finley concerned a vagueness
challenge to a statute that granted discretion to the National Endowment for
the Arts in selecting recipients of government grants for the arts.284 The
Court ruled that the statute, which required the commissioner to consider
“general standards of decency” and American values in selecting grant
recipients, 285 passed constitutional muster because “[i]t is unlikely . . . that
speakers will be compelled to steer too far clear of any ‘forbidden area’ in
the context of grants of this nature.” 286 The Court recognized that “artists
may conform their speech to what they believe to be the decisionmaking
criteria in order to acquire funding,” but did not find this result
“constitutionally severe.” 287 In contrast, 501(c)(3) organizations are likely
to steer clear of the “forbidden area” because the penalty for their political
activity is relatively harsh; 288 revocation of tax-exempt status would
threaten the existence of most charities.289 Additionally, the Court would
likely look at the chilling of political speech as more constitutionally severe
than the modification of artistic expression. 290 The Court in Finley also
noted that the “general standards of decency” provision merely “add[ed]
some imprecise considerations to an already subjective selection
process,” 291 since the statute otherwise called for consideration of “artistic
excellence” and merit. 292 This reasoning does not apply to section
501(c)(3)’s political prohibition.

282. Id.
283. TWR, 461 U.S. at 544. TWR is not dispositive of a vagueness challenge to section
501(c)(3), since the plaintiff there did not challenge the statute on those grounds. See
Taxation with Representation of Wash. v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 726 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
284. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572–73.
285. Id. at 576.
286. Id. at 588.
287. Id. at 589.
288. See Guinane, supra note 42, at 168 (“501(c)(3) organizations are risk averse when it
comes to electoral activity . . . due to both the severity of possible sanctions and the high cost
of time, money, and negative publicity caused by an IRS examination.”).
289. Cf. Chisolm, supra note 211, at 319 (“Thus, with very narrow exceptions, a section
501(c)(3) organization must steer carefully clear of all election-related activity. Failure to do
so will almost certainly mark the end of its existence.”); Klapach, supra note 186, at 506
(“Many charities . . . simply could not survive without the competitive advantages that tax
exemption under § 501(c)(3) affords them.”); Erik J. Ablin, Note, The Price of Not
Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Participation in Political Campaigns, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 557 (1999) (discussing “revocation of a
church’s tax-exempt status—on which many churches depend for financial survival”).
290. Compare Finley, 524 U.S. at 589, with Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898
(2010) (“The First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered
during a campaign for political office.” (internal citations omitted)).
291. Finley, 524 U.S. at 590.
292. Id. at 572.

3044

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

3. Overbreadth Analysis: How Much Regulation Is Too Much?
The political activity prohibition has also been challenged for
overbreadth. 293 The doctrine of overbreadth provides that a law is
unconstitutional if it regulates more speech than the Constitution allows to
be regulated. 294 For a law to be unconstitutionally overbroad, however, the
To meet the substantiality
overbreadth must be “substantial.” 295
requirement, the challenger must do more than “conceive of some
impermissible applications of a statute.” 296 Rather, there must be a
“realistic danger” that the statute will chill or prohibit the speech of third
parties not before the court. 297 Because the doctrine so focuses on the
rights of third parties, litigants may bring overbreadth challenges even if
their own speech is not subject to First Amendment protection.298 To meet
the substantiality requirement, then, the challenger must show that the law
would be overbroad in a significant number of scenarios. 299
Challenging section 501(c)(3)’s political activity prohibition for
overbreadth would require proving that in a significant number of
situations, the prohibition impermissibly restricts the First Amendment
rights of charities. 300 This, however, first requires proof that the prohibition
even constitutes a burden on charities’ First Amendment rights.301 As
discussed above, the success of such a claim is uncertain. 302 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has already stated that “Congress has not infringed any First
Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity” through
section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions. 303

293. See Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-670, 2009 WL 3320498, at
*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1143 (2012); Complaint for Tax Refund at ¶ 89e, Christian Coalition of Fla., Inc. v. United
States, 2009 WL 1890990 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2009) (No. 09-00144).
294. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 943; see also Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574–75 (1987) (striking down a resolution that prohibited all First
Amendment activity within an airport because it reached “even talking and reading, or the
wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing”); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 66, 76–77 (1981) (striking down an ordinance enacted to prohibit nude dancing
that unconstitutionally prohibited live entertainment of all kinds).
295. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574 (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458–59
(1987)); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 944.
296. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984).
297. Id. at 801.
298. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
This is a departure from the usual rule that litigants may not assert third-party standing. See
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 946. The exception is
allowed because those adversely affected by the overbroad law will, presumably, be deterred
from engaging in otherwise protected speech. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
299. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 945; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991).
300. See Galston, supra note 12, at 916.
301. See id. (“The answer to an overbreadth challenge thus presupposes an answer to the
prior, substantive question of the appropriate reach of the Code’s political restrictions.”).
302. See supra Part II.B.
303. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983)
(emphases added).
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In Catholic Answers, the plaintiffs claimed that the political prohibition is
overbroad because it “encompass[es] speech that is not . . . express
advocacy” for or against a candidate’s election.304 Their argument was
that, while the ban may be constitutional for reasons specific to political
speech, it is overbroad because it chills speech that is not political. 305 This
reasoning would likely fail for a number of reasons 306 if a court were to
reach the merits. 307 First, the court would likely apply a rational basis test,
given that tax laws are considered matters of legislative grace. 308 Even if a
challenger could first prove that the prohibition regulates conduct that is not
political activity, 309 it would not be difficult for the Government to then
articulate similar justifications for chilling conduct that is almost, but not
quite, political intervention. 310 Additionally, the existing rationales in
themselves might be enough to justify the prohibition of near-political
conduct, since the rational basis test does not require narrow tailoring.311
Moreover, courts view the overbreadth doctrine as “strong medicine,” and
enforce it “only as a last resort.” 312 Wherever possible, courts will construe
statutes narrowly in order to avoid overbreadth concerns. 313
While constitutional challenges to the political activity prohibition on
First Amendment grounds of vagueness and overbreadth face significant
hurdles, their failure is not a certainty. Regardless of their likelihood of
success, such challenges have been initiated and are likely to continue.314
Amending the prohibition—its definition, its extent, and its penalties—can
bolster the provision’s constitutional strength, and perhaps preempt many
challenges. The practical limitations of planning and enforcement
engendered by the current state of the prohibition could also be alleviated
through change. With these issues in mind, this Note turns to the
consideration of proposed alternatives.

304. Catholic Answers Complaint, supra note 246, ¶ 69.
305. The Catholic Answers Complaint defined “political activity” as express advocacy,
but this distinction is not necessary to the argument. The merit of the argument is the same
regardless of how political activity is defined.
306. See Galston, supra note 12, at 915–18 (conducting an overbreadth analysis and
concluding that there are “considerable obstacles” to a successful claim).
307. The court in Catholic Answers did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims.
See supra notes 242–48 and accompanying text.
308. See TWR, 461 U.S. at 547 (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Galston, supra note 12, at 916–17.
309. While commentators consider this proposition a foregone conclusion, it has not been
so held by courts. Its legitimacy may be tied to the outcome of a vagueness challenge; both
ask whether the “facts and circumstances” test can accurately define political activity. See
supra Part II.B.2.
310. See supra note 213 (discussing the ease with which legitimate state interests are
articulated under the rational basis test).
311. See id.
312. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
313. See id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 213, at 947.
314. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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III. EXAMINING PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Part III of this Note examines proposals to reform the ban put forth by
practitioners, scholars, and commentators. As in Part I.D, this part groups
proposals into three categories based on the aspect of the ban the author
seeks to reform. It first discusses proposals to change the definition of
prohibited political activity. It then turns to proposals that advocate for
change in how much political activity should be permitted. Finally, it
analyzes proposals to alter the penalties that the IRS may impose on
charities violating the prohibition.
A. Definitional Proposals: What Is Prohibited?
The following are existing proposals put forth by academics and
practitioners to change the definition of “political intervention” as it applies
to section 501(c)(3) and the related sections and regulations. These
proposals seek to cure the vagueness of the prohibition’s current definition
by identifying with greater precision what does or does not constitute
political intervention. They also strive to simplify planning by charities and
compliance efforts by the IRS by redefining the process of judging whether
an activity constitutes political activity.
In June 2009, OMB Watch 315 assembled a group of tax law experts and
practitioners to examine whether and how to change the political
The committee, headed by Greg Colvin (Colvin
prohibition. 316
Committee), proposed six rules to interpret the current statute through new
regulations governing the political activity of 501(c)(3) organizations.317
The Colvin Committee’s first draft proposes a new, two-pronged definition
of “participation or intervention in a campaign in support of or opposition
to any candidate for elective public office.” 318 Under the first prong, an
action that consists purely of speech will be political intervention only if (1)
it refers to a clearly identified candidate, and (2) it reflects a view on that
candidate. 319 This definition adopts the current IRS test for direct

315. OMB Watch is a nonprofit research and advocacy group focusing on the federal
budget, taxation, and nonprofit speech and advocacy rights. About Us, OMB WATCH,
http://www.ombwatch.org/about_us (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
316. OMB Watch, Clarifying IRS Rules on Political Intervention: A Discussion Draft
from the Colvin Committee 1 (Mar. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Colvin Committee Draft].
317. Id.
318. Id. at 2. While the Committee states that no change to the statutory definition of
“political intervention” is needed, the proposed tests for speech and conduct effectively
redefine, or at least more clearly define, what is political intervention. See id. at 4.
319. Id. The Committee offers three exceptions to this rule. First, communications
regarding public officials relating to actions they may yet perform in the current term,
without mention of an upcoming election or candidacy, are tolerated. Id. at 2. Second,
organizations may present information gathered using impartial methodology. Id. Third,
organizations may respond to statements made by a candidate either about the organization
itself or about a public policy issue on which the organization focuses. Id. at 3. Such
response must be limited to the subject matter of the candidate’s statement, and must not be
more publicly available than the candidate’s statement. Id. at 3.

2012]

501(C)(3) AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

3047

lobbying. 320 Speech that meets these characteristics is presumptively
political intervention, but the offending organization may rebut the
presumption by showing that the statements furthered the organization’s
charitable purpose and were unrelated to any campaign. 321 Under the
second prong, non-speech activities (resource deployment) are political
intervention if they consist of a “gift, subscription, loan, advance, deposit,
purchase, payment, or distribution of money or anything of value for the
purpose of influencing any election for public office,” or payment to any
person for services rendered to a candidate. 322 This second definition
adopts the language of the Federal Election Campaign Act 323 (FECA), and
defers to FECA’s definition of “contribution” at that time. 324
Kay Guinane suggests that any new bright-line rule should be guided by
the Supreme Court’s conception of genuine issue advocacy found in
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL). 325
In WRTL, the Court held that a communication that (1) focuses on a
legislative issue, takes a position on the issue, and calls on the public to
adopt that position; (2) without reference to any election, candidacy or
political party; and (3) takes no position on a candidate’s “character,
qualifications, or fitness for office” is not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy. 326 This proposal also follows the WRTL Court’s
assertions that neither the timing of a communication327 nor the relevance
of an issue to electoral debates may be considered to determine if the
communication is electioneering, 328 in contravention of Revenue Ruling
2007-41. 329

320. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(ii) (1990) (defining “direct lobbying” as
communication that “refers to specific legislation . . . and . . . [r]eflects a view on such
legislation”); Colvin Committee Draft, supra note 316, at 6.
321. Colvin Committee Draft, supra note 316, at 3.
322. Id. In-kind contributions are included in the definition of political intervention. Id.
323. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (2006); Colvin Committee Draft, supra note 316, at 14.
324. Colvin Committee Draft, supra note 316, at 3.
325. 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (holding section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,
which restricted corporate expenditures for electioneering communications, unconstitutional
as applied to ads that were not the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy); see also
Guinane, supra note 42, at 167–78.
326. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470; see also Guinane, supra note 42, at 167–68 (summarizing
the test).
327. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 472 (“That the ads were run close to an election is unremarkable
in a challenge like this.”).
328. Id. at 474 (“Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues
may also be pertinent in an election.”).
329. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424 (“Key factors in determining
whether a communication results in political campaign intervention include the
following: . . . Whether the issue addressed in the communication has been raised as an
issue distinguishing candidates for a given office; . . . Whether the communication is part of
an ongoing series of communications by the organization on the same issue that are made
independent of the timing of any election.”); supra Part I.C. Miriam Galston notes that “the
[“facts and circumstances”] method now employed by the IRS to determine whether a
nonprofit organization has intervened in a political campaign is exactly the method the Court
rejected in Wisconsin Right to Life.” Galston, supra note 12, at 890.
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Some have suggested the IRS adopt the “express advocacy” standard,330
set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, 331 which once governed corporate
expenditures under FECA. 332 Under this standard, charities would be able
to engage in political speech that does not advocate, in express terms, for
the defeat or election of a candidate for public office. 333 For nonspeech
activities, charities would be able to engage in any advocacy conduct that
does not constitute a direct campaign contribution. 334
Chris Kemmitt proposes to define political activities as those that involve
the expenditure of tax-exempt funds for partisan purposes. 335 Under this
definition, activities for which a charity does not spend funds—a church
endorsing candidates from the pulpit (and, by analogy, an organization’s
communications to its members), distribution of voter guides not prepared
by the organization, and certain candidate forums—would be
permissible. 336 Activities such as political fundraising, donations to
campaigns, and paid advertising would be impermissible.337
Joseph Klapach proposes two safe harbor provisions, which aim to take
certain activities out of the realm of political intervention. 338 The first safe
harbor provides that an organization will not have engaged in political
intervention if it conducts its activities in “as neutral and nonpartisan a
manner as is practicable under the circumstances,” even if those activities
have the potential to influence voter opinion.339 Neutrality would be
determined based on three factors: “the manner of presentation, the manner
of distribution, and the timing of the activity.” 340 Thus, political
330. See Ablin, supra note 289, at 583–84; Carroll, supra note 211, at 259–63 (proposing
to allow 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in political speech that is not express advocacy as
defined by FECA through the creation of a separate segregated fund under I.R.C. section
527(f)); Chisolm, supra note 211, at 362 (“[T]he reach of [section 501(c)(3)] should be
curtailed and clarified by defining participation and intervention to encompass only activities
that are ‘contributions’ or ‘expenditures’ for purposes of the Federal Election Campaign
Act.”).
331. 424 U.S. 1, 43–44 (1976) (per curiam) (construing section 608(e)(1) of FECA
narrowly to limit expenditures for communications that advocate for the election or defeat of
a candidate in express terms).
332. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17), (18) (2006) (defining an “independent expenditure” as one
made by a person “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate,” and defining “clearly identified” as using the name or photograph of, or
unambiguous reference to, a candidate). But see Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913
(2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent expenditures).
333. Chisolm, supra note 211, at 362. In Buckley, the Court defined express advocacy as
any communication “containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as
‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’
‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’” 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
334. Chisolm, supra note 211, at 362.
335. See Kemmitt, supra note 39, at 176.
336. Id. at 177.
337. See id. This proposal was formulated with the free exercise concerns of the politicoreligious activity of churches in mind. See id. at 176–77.
338. See Klapach, supra note 186, at 539–42.
339. Id. at 539.
340. Id. The test also considers and forgives special circumstances that would make pure
neutrality impossible, such as when there are too many candidates to give equal treatment to
all. Id. at 540.
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intervention is determined by the manner in which the activity is executed,
rather than the type of activity. 341 The second safe harbor provides that if
an organization is not able to show neutrality as described above, the
activity will not be considered political intervention if “the expression of
favoritism for the candidate is peripheral to the furtherance of the
organization’s legitimate exempt function.”342 Consequently, if the
political activity is merely incidental to an organization’s exempt function,
it will not be penalized.343
B. Quantitative Proposals: How Much Is Prohibited?
The previous section summarized existing proposals to change the
definition of political intervention in relation to section 501(c)(3). This
section discusses proposals that seek to change the amount of political
activity that is permissible. These proposals strive to eliminate First
Amendment concerns by giving charities the right to engage in some
political speech. 344 They also hope to aid charities in planning how much
activity they may conduct, and assist the IRS in determining when a charity
has crossed the line.
Perhaps the most well-known proposal to change the quantitative scope
of the political prohibition came from Congress. In 1996, Representatives
Philip Crane and Charles Rangel proposed the Religious Political Freedom
Act (Crane-Rangel Amendment). 345 The bill would have altered the
political prohibition in the following ways: churches could spend up to 5
percent of their gross revenues on political campaigning, and up to 20
percent of their gross revenues on lobbying activities, but no more than 20
percent of their gross revenues on electioneering and lobbying combined.346
The Crane-Rangel amendment would have applied only to churches,
leaving non-religious charities under the existing regulatory scheme.347
The bill was not passed. 348

341. See id. at 541 (“Under the proposed tests, IRS decision makers only need to consider
(1) whether an activity has the potential to influence voter opinion and (2) if so, whether the
organization has conducted the activity in a neutral fashion.”).
342. Id. at 540.
343. See id. Klapach provides the example of a tax-exempt mail bundling service formed
to provide jobs for the mentally disabled. If the organization provides mail service to
political campaigns, any influence on the associated election is incidental to the
organization’s goal of providing such employment. Id. (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-52-039
(Sept. 30, 1991)).
344. See Jennifer Rigterink, Comment, I’ll Believe It when I “C” It: Rethinking
§ 501(c)(3)’s Prohibition on Politicking, 86 TUL. L. REV. 493, 514 (2011).
345. H.R. 2910, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996).
346. Id.
347. Id. Other commentators have called for exceptions to the political activity
prohibition specifically for churches. See, e.g., Judy Ann Rosenblum, Religion and Political
Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 536, 555–56 (1981).
348. See Ablin, supra note 289, at 586.
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Some have called for Congress to impute the “substantial part” test of
section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying restriction 349 to the political prohibition.350
Under that standard, a charity may engage in political activity as long as it
does not constitute a substantial part of its activities. By the same logic,
charities might make an election similar to the one made for lobbying under
section 501(h), 351 to have the amount of their political activities held to a
quantifiable standard.352
C. Remedial Proposals: What Happens when Violations Occur?
This section summarizes proposals to change the repercussions faced by
charities that violate the prohibition, however it is defined. These proposals
potentially assuage the First Amendment concerns of the current
prohibition, since lesser penalties will likely chill less speech.
Roger Colinvaux, after examining other proposals, asserts that if
prohibiting political speech by charities is unconstitutional, the best solution
is to “allow” political activity, but to tax it.353 This proposal would
eliminate revocation of exempt status as a penalty for political activity,
while continuing the current taxation regime. 354 Colinvaux also proposes
to discount the charitable deductions available to donors whose funds are
used for political activity. 355 Under this system, Congress would not
subsidize the political speech of charities, since no exempt funds could be
used toward those activities. 356
Johnny Rex Buckles proposes an entirely new statutory regime, centered
on the distinction between independently and privately controlled
charities. 357 An “independent” charity would be one whose governing
board does not consist of a majority of “disqualified persons,” as defined by
section 4946(a)(1) of the Code. 358 Political expenditure made by
independent charities free from the influence of disqualified persons would
not be taxed. 359 Those made by non-independent charities, or by
349. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (defining a charity as an entity wherein “no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation”).
350. See Putney, supra note 210, at 32 n.88; Rigterink, supra note 344, at 514.
351. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (describing the permissible amount of lobbying by 501(c)(3)
organizations that elect to have 501(h) apply).
352. See Guinane, supra note 42, at 170.
353. Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 478.
354. See id.
355. Id. at 481.
356. Id.
357. See Buckles, supra note 39, at 1108–11. This proposal falls under the “remedial”
heading because it primarily alters who is penalized for political activity, and how such
penalty is carried out.
358. Id. at 1109. Section 4946 defines “disqualified person” as one who is a substantial
contributor to the organization, a foundation manager, owns 20 percent or more of either the
organization’s voting power (if a corporation), profits interest (if a partnership), or beneficial
interest of a trust that contributes to the organization, a family member of a disqualified
person, a business owned by a disqualified person, or a government official. See I.R.C.
§ 4946(a)(1).
359. Buckles, supra note 39, at 1102.
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independent charities whose decision to act has been influenced by a
disqualified person, will be subject to an excise tax.360 Under this proposal,
revocation of exempt status would not be an available remedy for political
activity, but charities would be subject to a ceiling on the amount of nonindependent, taxed political expenditures incurred yearly. 361
IV. WHAT SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT CHANGE
This Note seeks to advance proposals to change the political activity
prohibition of section 501(c)(3) with the following goals in mind: ease of
use for charities and the IRS, furtherance of congressional intent, and
constitutionality. While Congress’s motivation for enacting the prohibition
may be uncertain, 362 it is clear that Congress intended for organizations
exempt under 501(c)(3) to be kept out of politics. 363 Furthermore, there are
three legitimate justifications for the prohibition, as discussed above:
government should not, or does not want to, subsidize political speech and
thus become entangled in partisanship (entanglement); public charities, if
allowed to engage in politics, might serve private interests (private benefit);
and that the charitable purpose is, by definition, incompatible with partisan
politics (definitional). 364 This part evaluates the proposals discussed in Part
III in light of these rationales and goals, and offers its own proposals.
A. Considerations in Crafting Proposals
At the outset, this Note concludes that quantitative proposals,365 such as
allowing charities to engage in some small amount of political activity, are
not workable solutions to the problems posed by the current prohibition.
Those proposals are inapposite to the rationales of the prohibition, and
would likely lead to a swell of infringement, as some charities would use
their newfound political freedom to test the boundaries of the
Moreover, increased political participation would
prohibition. 366
exacerbate the difficulties faced by the IRS in enforcing the ban, 367 as the
number of charities engaging in political activity would increase
dramatically. Finally, quantitative proposals aim primarily to cure
constitutional questions surrounding the complete deprivation of political
speech; 368 yet, based on existing case law, those questions might be

360. Id. at 1101.
361. Id. at 1103–04. The amount exceeding the ceiling would be taxed at a rate of 200
percent, and would be paid by the organization’s managers. Id. at 1104.
362. See supra Part I.A.1.
363. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 226.
365. See supra Part III.B.
366. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing the possible snowball effect
of allowing small amounts of political activity to go unnoticed).
367. See supra Part II.A.
368. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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inconsequential. 369 Thus, quantitative proposals are more likely to harm,
rather than enhance, section 501(c)(3).
This Note also acknowledges the inherent difficulty in crafting a singular
definition of political activity, 370 which can take many and varied forms.371
While bright-line rules such as the express advocacy372 or direct lobbying
standards 373 offer ease of application, they can also be circumvented by
organizations that employ clever tactics to evade the strictures of the rule.
Although the “facts and circumstances” test offers considerable gray area
within which charities may operate politically, 374 they are at least subject to
investigation under that test. Thus, bright-line rules must be carefully
drafted to avoid compromising the spirit of the prohibition just for
usability’s sake. Additionally, limiting the definition of political activity to
expenditures 375 would not further the purpose of the prohibition. Under
such a regime, charities would engage in unchecked advocacy in the form
of oral expression. Finally, safe harbors are useful in creating exceptions to
a general rule, 376 but will necessarily suffer the same weaknesses as the
larger rule. For example, giving safe harbor to activity that is conducted in
as neutral a manner as possible, 377 or that is more charitable than
political, 378 calls for the same subjective assessment that the “facts and
circumstances” test involves.
Remedial proposals 379 do not suffer the inherent weaknesses of the other
types of proposals, but they must also be carefully crafted. They risk
encouraging more political activity if sanctions are weakened, and
exacerbating constitutional questions if they are strengthened. A common
theme of the remedial proposals is eliminating revocation as a sanction and
simply taxing political activity. 380 To the extent that entanglement
concerns 381 justify the prohibition, this is a sound proposal. Taxing
political activity would remove the government subsidy of those activities,
while avoiding the potential constitutional issues associated with stripping
all exemption benefits from an organization that engages in protected
speech. 382 But, without the deterrent effect of revocation,383 a modest
excise tax would encourage more political activity than the current
standard. Moreover, taxing political activity means that the activity is
369. See supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties facing different constitutional
challenges to the prohibition).
370. See supra Part III.A.
371. See supra Part I.C.
372. See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 173–85 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 335–37 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 319, 338–43 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
379. See supra Part III.C.
380. See supra Part III.C.
381. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
382. See supra Part II.B.1.
383. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
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permitted. 384 This result is inconsistent with the private benefit and
definitional rationales discussed above. 385
Revocation should be preserved as a sanction, but its application should
be retooled. Accordingly, this Note proposes two changes to section
501(c)(3), both of which focus on the remedial aspect of the political
activity prohibition.
B. Implement a Bright-Line Rule for Revocation
This Note first proposes to implement a bright-line rule, not for
determining political activity, but for determining when revocation is an
appropriate remedial measure. To make this determination, the IRS should
adopt the test proposed by the Colvin Committee, 386 which applies the
direct lobbying test to political communications. 387 Speech will constitute
revocable political intervention when it refers to a clearly identified
candidate and reflects a view on that candidate.388 This proposal responds
to the concern that, under the current regime, charities simply do not know
when they are engaging in activity that warrants revocation.389 The
consequences of revocation are severe,390 and to tie its use to the “facts and
circumstances” test is to force charities to walk a minefield; charities and
their legal counsel might interpret their actions differently than the IRS, and
unwittingly stumble into revocation.391 The proposed rule allows charities
to feel confident that their actions, even those that might test the boundaries
of the political activity prohibition, will not result in revocation unless they
meet specific criteria.
Although revocation is currently used sparingly, 392 the fear felt by
charities due to the uncertain application of such a strong measure is real
and should be alleviated.393 To ensure deterrence, the IRS should more
readily use revocation where activity meets the test set forth above.
Charities should know what activities are subject to revocation, yet they
should also have good reason to avoid those activities.
This Note does not advocate a bright-line rule for determining all
political speech. Given the substantial amount of infringement presently
occurring, 394 the IRS should not be limited in its ability to issue excise
taxes. 395 By narrowing the definition of political activity, a bright-line rule
would necessarily exclude some activity that might otherwise be caught by
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See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 316–17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 171, 185 and accompanying text.
See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
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the “facts and circumstances” test. 396 The IRS should maintain flexibility
in its capacity to tax political activity under a “facts and circumstances”
approach given the myriad forms of political advocacy, 397 and in
anticipation of forms yet unknown.
Revocation should be treated differently because it is the aspect of the
prohibition that raises constitutional issues. The Supreme Court found
section 501(c)(3) constitutional in the past because it viewed the restrictions
as Congress’s choice not to subsidize political activities, while still giving
charities the benefit of subsidy in other areas.398 Yet this characterization is
only true with respect to taxation as a penalty for political activity.399
Revocation of tax-exempt status for political activity has the collateral
effect of denying all subsidy—even of non-political activity. 400 Because of
these concerns, the “facts and circumstances” test should not be used to
determine when revocation is appropriate.
C. Repeal Section 504
This Note next proposes the repeal of section 504, which prevents
charities whose exempt status has been revoked from filing for exemption
under section 501(c)(4). 401 Concurrently, a section should be enacted
expressly stating that charities whose exempt status has been revoked may
not refile for exemption under 501(c)(3). This modification serves three
purposes. First, allowing re-exemption under 501(c)(4) will remove the
constitutionally questionable proposition of losing all exempt benefits
through revocation. 402 Second, this change will chill less protected speech.
Organizations that value political discourse will venture closer to the
prohibited zone, 403 knowing that violation will at worst strip them of some
benefit (the charitable deduction), but not all benefits, since 501(c)(4)
organizations are exempt. 404 Finally, allowing charities whose exempt
status has been revoked simply to refile for exemption under 501(c)(3)
undermines the deterrent effect of revocation. 405
These proposals aim to provoke self-assessment from charities. By
clearly articulating what conduct will result in revocation, and by allowing
those revoked to re-file under 501(c)(4), charities are given the opportunity
to decide whether they are better defined by section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4).
By its plain text, section 501(c)(3) defines eligible organizations as ones
that do not participate in political campaigns. By definition, then, a charity
396. See supra notes 370–74 and accompanying text.
For example, some
communications might not clearly identify a particular candidate, but are sufficiently biased
to constitute political activity subject to an excise tax.
397. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 219–26 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 222, 289 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 222, 289, 398–400 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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that engages in political activity is simply not a charity. Revocation can be
more accurately described as a re-categorization than a sanction—a shooing
of an organization that has filed for exemption under the wrong heading.
These proposals strive to move the political activity prohibition toward a
regime under which only those who have made a conscious choice to define
their organization by political activity will face the harshest penalty. More
innocent infringers need not worry about stumbling into revocation, and, as
a result, should engage in more protected speech.
CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of any proposal will depend largely on how the IRS
enforces the prohibition. Currently, most cases of infringement result in a
warning letter. 406 Even if those violations are small,407 allowing them to
escape with only a warning forces the government to subsidize them—
cumulatively, the effect is large. The proposals set forth above will only
have their intended effect if the IRS more readily utilizes the sanctions at its
disposal. More proactive enforcement, combined with the retooled
remedial measures discussed above, will provide section 501(c)(3) with the
proper balance of deterrence and constitutional protection.
While the IRS faces a daunting task in enforcing the political activity
prohibition, Congress can help by tweaking its mechanics. The definitional
and remedial changes discussed above will provide greater certainty for
charities, clearer guidance for the IRS, and increased constitutional security
for section 501(c)(3). Now more than ever, charities will need to advocate
for their causes in ways that are not campaign intervention. The proposals
discussed here will allow them to do that, while keeping the spirit of section
501(c)(3) intact.

406. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.

